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ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION
AND AVERAGE PAYOFF
SUBHAMAY SAHA
Abstract. We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with
average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable
game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of optimal
strategies for both the players.
1. Introduction
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley in [9]. Following this pioneering work there
has been a lot of work on stochastic games. For a survey on zero-sum games we refer to [10].
Most of the available literature in this category concerns stochastic games with complete
observation, i.e., at each stage, the state of the game is completely known to the play-
ers. Although there is considerable amount of literature (see [2], [3], [4] and the references
therein) available on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) of which
stochastic games are a generalisation, the corresponding literature in partially observable
stochastic games is rather sparse. In [5] the authors study zero-sum games for partially
observable stochastic games under discounted payoff criterion. In this article we investigate
the same problem with the average payoff criterion. In [3] the authors study POMDP
under the average cost criteria using the approach based on Athreya-Ney-Nummelin con-
struction of pseudo-atoms ([1], [8]) as described in [7]. In this article we extend those ideas
to the zero-sum game case. Zero-sum stochastic games are generally studied by solving the
corresponding dynamic programming or Shapely equations [10]. This approach has also
been carried out for partially observable games in [5]. In this paper instead of solving the
appropriate Shapely equations we solve two dynamic programming type inequalities, which
in turn lead to the existence of a value and saddle point strategies. Also our article extends
the idea of using the pseudo-atom approach in solving MDP, to the stochastic game setup.
Under certain Lyapunov assumption we use the pseudo-atom construction to carry out a
coupling argument, which gives us appropriate bound on the relative α−discounted value
function. This bound then enables us to make appropriate limiting arguments.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In
Section 3 we use the vanishing discount approach to prove the existence of a value and a
saddle-point equilibrium for the POSG. We conclude with a few remarks in Section 4.
2. Preliminaries and Model Description
Let X,Y and U, V be Polish spaces representing state, observation and action spaces for
player 1 and player 2 respectively. We further assume that U and V are compact. For any
Polish space S, we denote by P(S) the Polish space of probability measures on S and by
B(S) the Borel σ-field on S. Let {Xn} be an X-valued partially observed controlled Markov
chain with Y -valued observation process {Yn}. Let
(x, u, v) ∈ X × U × V → p(dz, dy|x, u, v) ∈ P(X × Y )
be a transition kernel which is assumed to be continuous in its arguments. Let λ denote a
regular Borel radon measure on X. We assume the existence of a probability measure η on
Y and a ϕ ∈ Cb(X × U × V ×X × Y ), with ϕ(·) > 0 such that
p(dz, dy|x, u, v) = ϕ(x, u, v, z, y)λ(dz)η(dy) .
The chain is controlled by two players. The first player chooses his actions from U and
player 2 chooses his actions from V . Let {Un} be an U -valued control sequence of player 1
and {Vn} be a V -valued control sequence of player 2. The transition probability function of
the controlled chain {Xn} together with the observation chain {Yn} is given by
P(Xn+1 ∈ A,Yn+1 ∈ B|Xm, Ym, Um, Vm,m ≤ n) =
∫
A
∫
B
ϕ(Xn, Un, Vn, z, y)λ(dz), η(dy)
for A ∈ B(X) and B ∈ B(Y ). The partially observed stochastic game (POSG) under
ergodic payoff criteria is the following:
(i) The initial distribution of the (unobservable) state process is ψ which is known to both
the players; Y0 is deterministic, say Y0 = y
∗ for some fixed element y∗ in Y .
(ii) At the 0th epoch the players based on the knowledge that the initial distribution of
the state process is ψ, independently choose actions u0 ∈ U and v0 ∈ V . Consequently,
conditional on the event X0 = x0 player 1 gets an (unobservable) payoff c(x0, u0, v0) from
player 2. Here
c : X × U × V → R+
is assumed to be a bounded continuous function. The next state and observation pair
(X1, Y1) is generated according to the stochastic kernel p(dz, dy|x0, u0, v0).
(iii) Now conditioned on the event Y1 = y1 the players again choose their actions and so on.
This process is repeated over an infinite time horizon.
(iv) Each player can recall at any time the observations and actions of the past.
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We now construct a probability space on which all the random variables are defined. the
canonical sample space is defined as
Ω := (X × Y × U × V )∞ .
A generic element is of the form
ω = (x0, y0, u0, v0, x1, · · · ) , xi ∈ X, yi ∈ Y, ui ∈ U, vi ∈ V .
The history spaces are defined as
H0 = X × Y, Hn+1 := Hn × U × V ×X × Y .
The state, observation, actions and history processes denoted by {Xn}, {Yn}, {Un}, {Vn}, {Hn}
respectively are defined by the projections
Xn(ω) = xn Yn(ω) = yn
Un(ω) = un Vn(ω) = vn
Hn(ω) = (x0, y0, u0, v0, · · · , un−1, vn−1, xn, yn) .
The entire history up to time n is not available to the players for decision making at time
n. The players have to make their decisions based on the observed history or information
vector
in := (y0, u0, v0, · · · , un−1, vn−1, yn)
and the initial distribution ψ. We define the information spaces as follows:
I0 := Y, In+1 := In × U × V × Y .
The information process is defined by
In(ω) = (y0, u0, v0, · · · , un−1, vn−1, yn) .
An admissible strategy for player 1 is a sequence pi1 = {pi1n} of stochastic kernels on U
given P(X) × In. The set of admissible strategies for player 1 is denoted by Π
1. Similarly
an admissible strategy for player 2 is a sequence pi2 = {pi2n} of stochastic kernels on V
given P(X) × In. The set of admissible strategies for player 2 is denoted by Π
2. With ψ in
P(X) and a pair of admissible strategies (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π1 ×Π2 specified, there exists a unique
probability measure Ppi
1,pi2
ψ on (Ω,B(Ω)) defined by
P
pi1,pi2
ψ (dx0, dy0, du0, dv0, · · · , dun−1, dvn−1, dxn, dyn)
= ψ(dx0)δy∗(dy0)pi
1
0(du0|ψ, y0)pi
2
0(dv0|ψ, y0)p(dx1, dy1|x0, u0, v0) · · · (2.1)
pi1n−1(dun−1|ψ, y0, u0, v0, · · · , yn−1)pi
2
n−1(dun−1|ψ, y0, u0, v0, · · · , yn−1)p(dxn, dyn|xn−1, un−1, vn−1) .
We now describe the payoff criterion. Given the initial distribution ψ and a pair of strategies
(pi1, pi2) ∈ Π1 ×Π2, the average payoff criterion is given by
Vpi1,pi2(ψ) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
E
pi1,pi2
ψ
n−1∑
k=0
c(Xk, Uk, Vk) (2.2)
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where Epi
1,pi2
ψ is the expectation with respect to the probability measure P
pi1,pi2
ψ . Player 1
wishes to maximise Vpi1,pi2(ψ) over all his admissible strategies and player 2 wishes to min-
imise the same over all his admissible strategies. A strategy pi∗1 is said to be optimal for
player 1 if
Vpi∗1,pi2(ψ) ≥ inf
Π2
sup
Π1
Vpi1,pi2(ψ)
for any pi2 ∈ Π2. Similarly a strategy pi∗2 is said to be optimal for player 2 if
Vpi1,pi∗2(ψ) ≤ sup
Π1
inf
Π2
Vpi1,pi2(ψ)
for any pi1 ∈ Π1. The game is said to have a value if
inf
Π2
sup
Π1
Vpi1,pi2(ψ) = sup
Π1
inf
Π2
Vpi1,pi2(ψ) .
If a pair of optimal strategies (pi∗1, pi∗2) exists for both the players then the pair (pi∗1, pi∗2)
is called a saddle point equilibrium. Now since the original state process is unobservable we
define another state variable which is observable to the players. In order to achieve that, we
have by conditioning
Vpi1,pi2(ψ) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E
pi1,pi2
ψ [c˜(Ψm, Um, Vm)] , (2.3)
where {Ψn} is the regular conditional law of Xn given In, satisfying the recursion
Ψn+1(dz) =
∫
X
Ψn(dx)ϕ(x,Un, Vn, z, Yn+1)λ(dz)∫
X
∫
X
Ψn(dx)ϕ(x,Un, Vn, z, Yn+1)λ(dz)
, n ≥ 0 (2.4)
and
c˜(ψ, u, v) =
∫
X
c(x, u, v)ψ(dx) .
Equation (2.4) is known as the filtering equation. Note that since Y0 is deterministic, Ψ0 =
the law of X0. This allows us to consider an equivalent stochastic game with P(X)-valued
state process {Ψn} with its evolution given by (2.4), under the same set of admissible
strategies and with the payoff criterion given by (2.3). This is a completely observable
stochastic game (COSG) because Ψn is known to both the players via the information
upto time n. Thus we can solve the original POSG by solving this equivalent COSG. Now
in order to show that the POSG model under the average payoff criterion has a saddle
point equilibrium and a value we impose the following Lyapunov type assumptions on our
model.
(A1) There exists inf-compact functions h and V ∈ C(X) satisfying h ≥ 1, such that under
any pair of admissible strategies and for any initial distribution
E(V(Xn+1)|Fn)− V(Xn) ≤ −h(Xn) + cIK(Xn) (2.5)
where K is some compact set with λ(K) > 0 and Fn = σ(Xk, Yk, Uk, Vk, k ≤ n). We have
dropped the super- and subscripts on E for notational convenience. Let
τK = min{n ≥ 0 : Xn ∈ K} .
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Then it is well known that ([7])
E[τK |X0 = x] = O(V(x)) .
Define
P0(X) = {µ ∈ P(X) :
∫
Vdµ <∞} .
Now using (2.5) we obtain
E[V(Xn+1)] = E[
∫
X
V(x)dΨn+1(dx)]
≤ E[V(Xn)] + constant
= E[
∫
X
V(x)dΨn(dx)] + constant .
Hence it follows that if Ψ0 ∈ P0(X) then Ψn ∈ P0(X), ∀n ≥ 1. We assume that Ψ0 ∈ P0(X)
and hence {Ψn} can be viewed as a P0(X)-valued process. We further assume that
(A2) Under all admissible strategies and for any initial distribution
lim
n→∞
E[V(Xn)]
n
= 0 .
3. Saddle Point Strategies and Value
We follow the vanishing discount approach to solve the average cost problem. Let α ∈
(0, 1). Then consider the following discounted payoff POSG:
V pi
1,pi2
α (ψ) = E
pi1,pi2
ψ [
∞∑
k=0
αkc(Xk, Uk, Vk)]
Player 1 tries to maximise the above quantity over all his admissible strategies and player
2 tries to minimise the same quantity over his admissible strategies. The definitions for the
value of the game and for the optimal strategies can be given analogous to that of average
payoff criterion. The following theorem can be proved using the equivalence with theCOSG
as discussed above and standard arguments as in [5]:
Theorem 3.1. The discounted payoff POSG has a value and the value function Vα(.) is
the unique bounded solution of the following pair of Shapley equations:
Vα(ψ) = min
ν∈P(V )
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α
∫
P0(X)
Vα(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
= max
µ∈P(U)
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α
∫
P0(X)
Vα(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|pi, µ, ν)
]
(3.1)
where
φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν) =
∫
U
∫
V
φ˜(dψ′|ψ, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv)
with φ˜(dψ′|ψ, u, v) being the controlled transition kernel of the Markov chain {Ψn}, and
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) =
∫
U
∫
V
c˜(ψ, u, v)µ(du)ν(dv) .
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Moreover let u∗ : P0(X) → P(U) be a measurable function such that u
∗(.) is an outer
maximiser of (3.1) then the strategy {pi∗n
1} given by
pi∗n
1(·|in) = u
∗(ψn)(·) .
is optimal for player 1. Further let v∗ : P0(X)→ P(V ) be a measurable function such that
v∗(.) is an outer minimiser of (3.1) then {pi∗n
2} given by
pi∗n
2(·|in) = v
∗(ψn)(·) .
is an optimal strategy for player 2.
Now for the vanishing discount approach we need to compare Vα(.) for two different
values of its argument. For that we construct on a common probability space two X-valued
controlled Markov chains as above, controlled by the same pair of strategies but with dif-
ferent initial distributions ψˆ and ψ˜. This is done by a modification of the construction in
the previous section. Let {pi1n} be an admissible strategy for player 1 and let {pi
2
n} be an
admissible strategy for player 2. Define
Ω¯ = (X ×X × Y × Y × U × V )∞
with F¯ being the corresponding product Borel σ-algebra. Define P¯pi
1,pi2
ψˆ,ψ˜
, a probability mea-
sure on (Ω¯, F¯) by
P¯
pi1,pi2
ψˆ,ψ˜
(dxˆ0, dx˜0, dyˆ0, dy˜0, du0, dv0, dxˆ1, dx˜1, dyˆ1, dy˜1, du1, dv1, · · · , dun−1, dvn−1, dxˆn, dx˜n, dyˆn, dy˜n)
= ψˆ(dxˆ0)ψ˜(dx˜0)δy∗(dyˆ0)δy∗(dy˜0)pi
1
0
(du0|ψˆ, yˆ0)pi
2
0
(dv0|ψ˜, y˜0)p(dxˆ1, dyˆ1|xˆ0, u0, v0)p(dx˜1, dy˜1|x˜0, u0, v0)
pi1
1
(du1|ψˆ, yˆ0, u0, v0, yˆ1)pi
2
1
(dv1|ψ˜, y˜0, u0, v0, y˜1) · · ·pi
1
n−1(dun−1|ψˆ, yˆ0, u0, v0, yˆ1, · · · , un−2, vn−2, yˆn−1)
pi2n−1(dvn−1|ψ˜, y˜0, u0, v0, y˜1, · · · , un−2, vn−2, y˜n−1)p(dxˆn, dyˆn|xˆn−1, un−1, vn−1)p(dx˜n, dy˜n|x˜n−1, un−1, vn−1) .
On (Ω¯, F¯ , P¯), define the processes {Xˆn}, {X˜n}, {Yˆn}, {Y˜n}, {Un}, {Vn} canonically. Then
the Markov chains {Xˆn}, {X˜n} on (Ω¯, F¯ , P¯) form the desired pair. For notational simplicity
we omit the superscripts and subscripts on P¯. We denote by X¯n = (Xˆn, X˜n) and the
associated observation pair by Y¯n = (Yˆn, Y˜n). Then {X¯n} is an X
2 valued Markov chain.
Let the controlled transition kernel be denoted by
p¯(dz¯, dy¯|x¯, u, v) ∈ P(X2 × Y 2)
for x¯ = (x1, x2) ∈ X
2. Define G = K2 and define Θ ∈ P(X2) by
Θ(A) =
λ× λ(A ∩G)
λ(K)2
for any Borel set A of X2. Then if follows from our assumptions that
p¯(A× Y 2|x¯, u, v) ≥ δIG(x¯)Θ(A)
where δ = 12(infx∈K,u∈U,v∈V,z∈K
∫
Y
ϕ(x, u, v, z, y)η(dy)λ(K))2 . This is the minorization con-
dition of [7] in the present context which enables us to carry out the Athreya-Ney-Nummelin
construction of pseudo-atom [7].
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Let H = X2 and H∗ = X2 × {0, 1}. Endow H∗ with its Borel σ−field. For any measure
µ on H, define a measure µ∗ on H∗ as follows: For Borel A ⊂ H, let A0 = A × {0} and
A1 = A× {1}. Then
µ∗(A0) = (1− δ)µ(A ∩K
2) + µ(A ∩ (K2)c)
µ∗(A1) = δµ(A ∩K
2) .
For a measure µ on H × Y 2, we define the measure µ∗ on H∗ × Y 2 by
µ∗(A0 ×D) = (1− δ)µ((A ∩K
2)×D) + µ((A ∩ (K2)c)×D)
µ∗(A1 ×D) = δµ((A ∩K
2)×D) ,
for D ⊂ Y 2 Borel. On a suitable probability space (Ω∗,F∗,P∗), define an H∗-valued con-
trolled Markov chain {X∗n, i
∗
n} (where X
∗
n = (Xˆ
∗
n, X˜
∗
n)) with U - valued control process {U
∗
n}
and V - valued control process {V ∗n } and Y
2-valued observation process {Y ∗n }, such that:
(i) The controlled transition kernel of {X∗n, i
∗
n, Y
∗
n } is given by: for x = (x0, i0) ∈ H
∗,
q(dx¯, dy¯|x, u, v) = p¯∗(dx¯, dy¯|x0, u, v), x ∈ H0 −K
2 × {0}
=
1
1− δ
(p¯∗(dx¯, dy¯|x0, u, v)− δΘ
∗(dx¯)η2(dy¯)), x ∈ K2 × {0}
= Θ∗(dx¯)η2(dy¯), x ∈ H1 ,
(ii)
P
∗((X∗0 , i
∗
0) ∈ A0, Y
∗
0 ∈ A
′, U∗0 ∈ ∆, V
∗
0 ∈ Γ) =(1− δ)P¯(X¯0 ∈ A ∩K
2, Y¯0 ∈ A
′, U0 ∈ ∆, V0 ∈ Γ)
+ P¯(X¯0 ∈ A ∩ (K
2)c, Y¯0 ∈ A
′, U0 ∈ ∆, V0 ∈ Γ)
P
∗((X∗0 , i
∗
0) ∈ A1, Y
∗
0 ∈ A
′, U∗0 ∈ ∆, V
∗
0 ∈ Γ) = δP¯(X¯0 ∈ A ∩K
2, Y¯0 ∈ A
′, U0 ∈ ∆, V0 ∈ Γ)
for A ⊂ H,A′ ⊂ Y 2,∆ ⊂ U,Γ ⊂ V Borel,
(iii) and
P
∗(U∗n ∈ ∆, V
∗
n ∈ Γ|(X
∗
m, i
∗
m, Y
∗
m) = (xm, im, ym),m ≤ n,U
∗
k = uk, V
∗
k = vk, k < n)
= P¯(Un ∈ ∆, Vn ∈ Γ|(X¯m, Y¯m) = (xm, ym),m ≤ n,Uk = uk, Vk = vk, k < n) for n ≥ 1 .
From the above construction the following lemmas can be proved.
Lemma 3.2. The set K2 × {1} is an accessible atom of {(X∗n, i
∗
n)} in the sense of Meyn
and Tweedie ([7]).
Lemma 3.3. For any Borel Ai ⊂ H,Bi ⊂ Y 2,∆i ⊂ U,Γi ⊂ V, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, n ≥ 0
P
∗
(
((X∗0 , i
∗
0, Y
∗
0 , U
∗
0 , V
∗
0 ), · · · , (X
∗
n, i
∗
n, Y
∗
n , U
∗
n, V
∗
n )) ∈
n∏
i=0
(Ai0 ∪A
i
1)×B
i ×∆i × Γi
)
= P¯
(
((X¯0, Y¯0, U0, V0), · · · , (X¯n, Y¯n, Un, Vn)) ∈
n∏
i=0
Ai ×Bi ×∆i × Γi
)
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Let
τ = min{n ≥ 0 : (X∗n, i
∗
n) ∈ K
2 × {1}} . (3.2)
Then the following lemma can be proved using (A1) and standard arguments as in [7]
Lemma 3.4. Under (A1) we have,
E
∗[τ | (X∗0 , i
∗
0) = (x, i)] = O(V(x1) + V(x2)) (3.3)
for any (x, i) = ((x1, x2), i) ∈ X
2 × {0, 1}, where τ is as in (3.2).
The following lemma gives a bound on the difference of Vα(.) for two different values of
its argument.
Lemma 3.5. For ψˆ, ψ˜ ∈ P0(X), there exists a suitable constant K¯ such that
|Vα(ψˆ)− Vα(ψ˜)| ≤ K¯[
∫
Vdψˆ +
∫
Vdψ˜] .
Proof. Let Vα(ψˆ) ≥ Vα(ψ˜). The other case can be handled with a symmetric argument. Let
pi1 = {pi1n} be an optimal policy for player 1 for the discounted payoff POSG with initial
distribution ψˆ and let pi2 = {pi2n} be an optimal policy for player 2 for the discounted payoff
POSG with initial distribution ψ˜. Then we have
|Vα(ψˆ)− Vα(ψ˜)| ≤ |
∞∑
m=0
αmE¯
pi1,pi2
ψˆ,ψ˜
[c(Xˆn, Un, Vn)]−
∞∑
m=0
αmE¯
pi1,pi2
ψˆ,ψ˜
[c(X˜n, Un, Vn)]|
= |
∞∑
m=0
αmE¯[c(Xˆn, Un, Vn)− c(X˜n, Un, Vn)]|
≤ |E∗
τ∑
m=0
αm[c(Xˆ∗n, U
∗
n, V
∗
n )− c(X˜
∗
n, U
∗
n, V
∗
n )]|
≤ 2||c||∞E
∗(τ)
where the third step follows from the fact that Xˆ∗τ+m, X˜
∗
τ+m for m ≥ 1 has the same law
conditioned on all the information up to time τ . Thus from (3.3) we have
|Vα(ψ1)− Vα(ψ2)| ≤ K¯E¯[V(Xˆ0) + V(X˜0)] .
Hence the lemma follows. 
Now fix ψ∗ ∈ P0(X). Define V¯α(ψ) = Vα(ψ)− Vα(ψ
∗). Thus substituting in (3.1) we get
V¯α(ψ) + (1− α)Vα(ψ
∗) = min
ν∈P(V )
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
= max
µ∈P(U)
min
ν∈P(V )
[
˜¯c(ψ, µ, ν) + α
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
. (3.4)
Now (1− α)Vα(ψ
∗) is bounded. Thus we can find an α(n)→ 1 such that
(1− α(n))Vα(n)(ψ
∗)→ γ (3.5)
for some γ ∈ R. Let Vˆ (ψ) = lim sup
n→∞
V¯α(n)(ψ) and V (ψ) = lim inf
n→∞
V¯α(n)(ψ).
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Lemma 3.6. The function Vˆ satisfies
Vˆ (ψ) + γ ≤ max
µ∈P(U)
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) +
∫
P0(X)
Vˆ (ψ′)φ(dψ′|pi, µ, ν)
]
, (3.6)
where γ is as in (3.5).
Proof. We have
V¯α(n)(ψ) + (1− α(n))Vα(n)(ψ
∗) = max
µ∈P(U)
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
.
Now taking limit n→∞ in the above we get
Vˆ (ψ) + γ = lim sup
n→∞
max
µ∈P(U)
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
= lim sup
n→∞
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ∗n, ν) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ∗n, ν)
]
≤ min
ν∈P(V )
lim sup
n→∞
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ∗n, ν) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ∗n, ν)
]
.
In the second step µ∗n is the outer maximiser. Now fix pi. By dropping to a subsequence if
necessary, we may suppose that V¯α(n)(ψ) → Vˆ (ψ) and µ
∗
n → µ
∗ in P(U). Now by previous
lemma |V¯α(ψ)| ≤ K1(1+
∫
Vdψ). Thus by Lemma 8.3.7 in [6], the last expression is bounded
above by
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ∗, ν) +
∫
P0(X)
Vˆ (ψ′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ∗n, ν)
]
≤ max
µ∈P(U)
min
ν∈P(V )
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) +
∫
P0(X)
Vˆ (ψ′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
.
The claim follows. 
Similarly we have the following result.
Lemma 3.7. The function V satisfies
V (ψ) + γ ≥ min
ν∈P(V )
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) +
∫
P0(X)
V (ψ′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
. (3.7)
Proof. We have
V¯α(n)(ψ) + (1− α(n))Vα(n)(ψ
∗) = min
ν∈P(V )
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
.
Now taking limit n→∞ in the above we get
V (ψ) + γ = lim inf
n→∞
min
ν∈P(V )
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
= lim inf
n→∞
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν∗n) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν∗n)
]
≥ max
µ∈P(U)
lim inf
n→∞
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν∗n) + α(n)
∫
P0(X)
V¯α(n)(ψ
′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν∗n)
]
.
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In the second step ν∗n is the outer minimiser. Now by arguments analogous to the proof of
the above lemma we have that there exists a ν∗ ∈ P(V ) such that the last expression is
bounded below by
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν∗) +
∫
P0(X)
V (ψ′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν∗)
]
≥ min
ν∈P(V )
max
µ∈P(U)
[
¯˜c(ψ, µ, ν) +
∫
P0(X)
V (ψ′)φ(dψ′|ψ, µ, ν)
]
.
The claim follows. 
Finally we get the following theorem:
Theorem 3.8. Assume (A1-A2). Then γ (as in (3.5)) is the value of the COSG. More-
over let u∗ : P0(X)→ P(U) be a measurable function such that u
∗(.) is the outer maximiser
of the righthand side of (3.6) (exists by our assumptions and a standard measurable selection
theorem). Then the strategy {pi∗n
1} given by
pi∗n
1(·|in) = u
∗(ψn)(·)
is an optimal strategy for player 1. Similarly let v∗ : P0(X) → P(V ) be a measurable
function such that v∗(.) is the outer minimiser of the righthand side of (3.7). Then {pi∗n
2}
given by
pi∗n
2(·|in) = v
∗(ψn)(·)
is an optimal strategy for player 2.
Proof. Let {pi2n} be an arbitrary admissible strategy of player 2. Then we have from (3.6)
E
pi∗1,pi2
ψ [Vˆ (Ψn)] + γ ≤ E
pi∗1,pi2
ψ [c˜(Ψn, Un, Vn)] + E
pi∗1,pi2
ψ [Vˆ (Ψn+1)], n ≥ 0
Therefore we have
γ ≤
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E
pi∗1,pi2
ψ [c˜(Ψm, Um, Vm)] +
E
pi∗1,pi2
ψ [Vˆ (Ψn)]− Vˆ (ψ)
n
.
Then by taking limit n→∞ we have using assumption (A2)
γ ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E
pi∗1,pi2
ψ [c˜(Ψm, Um, Vm)] .
Similarly, if {pi1n} is an arbitrary admissible strategy for player 1, then we have by (3.7)
E
pi1,pi∗2
ψ [V (Ψn)] + γ ≥ E
pi1,pi∗2
ψ [c˜(Ψn, Un, Vn)] + E
pi1,pi∗2
ψ [V (Ψn+1)], n ≥ 0 .
Therefore we have
γ ≥
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E
pi1,pi∗2
ψ [c˜(Ψm, Um, Vm)] +
E
pi1,pi∗2
ψ [V (Ψn)]− V (ψ)
n
.
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Then by taking limit n→∞ we have using assumption (A2)
γ ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
m=0
E
pi1,pi∗2
ψ [c˜(Ψm, Um, Vm)] .
Now the conclusions follow. 
Now the following theorem follows from Theorem 3.8 and the equivalence of COSG and
POSG.
Theorem 3.9. The POSG with average cost criterion has a value and is equal to γ (as
in (3.5)) for any initial distribution. Moreover, ({pi∗n
1}, {pi∗n
2}) given by Theorem 3.8 is a
saddle point equilibrium.
4. Conclusion
In this article we study a partially observed stochastic game under average payoff cri-
terion. We estimate the unobservable state variable and use the state estimate as our new
observable state variable . We then use the vanishing discount approach to solve the aver-
age cost problem. Our analysis involves a coupling argument which uses the machinery of
pseudo-atom construction. We show that the game has a value and also prove the existence
of a saddle point equilibrium for our partially observable model.
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